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Issue 1

COURT REPORTS

national forests, since Congress had the authority to re-reserve land
for changed purposes.
Next, because the Act did not expressly reserve water rights, the
court looked to see if reserved rights were implicit in the Act. A court
will infer an intent to reserve water if the water were necessary to satisfy
the primary purposes of the reservation. The Act's purpose was
maintaining the designated area in its pristine natural condition.
Therefore, the Idaho Supreme Court agreed with the SRBA's
determination that strictly applying Idaho's prior appropriation
regime was inconsistent with this purpose. The court also agreed that
removing any water within the Wilderness Areas would defeat the
purposes of the Act. Subsequently, the court affirmed the SRBA's
determination that Congress intended to reserve all unappropriated
waters within the Wilderness Areas.
The second issue was whether the United States held federal
reserved water rights to all unappropriated flows of tributaries to the
Snake River originating within Hell's Canyon. The court determined
the federal reserved water rights doctrine was satisfied because Hell's
Canyon was withdrawn by federal statute. The withdrawal's purpose
was to preserve the natural beauty and historical values of the Hell's
Canyon area for future generations. The court rejected the argument
that the Hell's Canyon Act was merely a land management statute.
Therefore, the court affirmed the SRBA's finding that Hell's Canyon
withdrawal was a governmental land reservation, and thus satisfied the
reserved rights doctrine.
The SRBA and the Idaho Supreme Court both concluded that the
Hell's Canyon Act expressly reserved the tributaries of the Snake River
within Hell's Canyon. The plain language of the Hell's Canyon Act
clearly stated that Hell's Canyon would comprise all land and water
within the area. Therefore, the United States was entitled to reserve
all unappropriated water flows in the tributaries of the Snake River
originating within Hell's Canyon.
Kirk Waible
INDIANA
Carnahan v. Moriah Property Owners Ass'n, Inc., 716 N.E.2d 437 (Ind.
1999) (holding that a party wishing to establish a recreational
prescriptive easement must show by clear and convincing evidence
that their use was adverse to the owner).
In 1972, the Carnahan family purchased property that included
two and one half percent of Lake Julia, a private lake. Until the
Carnahans filed suit in 1993, the family engaged in recreational activity
on the lake such as boating, water skiing, and jet skiing. Moriah
Property Owners Association, Inc. ("Moriah") owned approximately
sixty-four percent of Lake Julia. Before Moriah took title to the

WATER LAW REVIEW

Volume 3

property, the Drewy family owned the property for several years. The
Carnahan's engaged in their recreational activities while the Drewy's
owned the property and continued when Moriah took ownership.
Moriah then established a covenant restricting the use of watercraft on
the lake, in order to prevent harm to children and adults swimming in
the lake.
After the issuance of the restrictive covenant, the Carnahans filed
suit to establish a prescriptive easement for the use of watercraft on the
lake and to quiet title to such easement. Moriah counter-claimed for
an injunction to stop the use of watercraft on the lake. The trial court
determined the Carnahans had established a prescriptive easement for
recreational use of watercraft on the lake. The appeals court affirmed.
The Supreme Court of Indiana analyzed the standard a claimant must
meet in order to establish a recreational prescriptive easement and
whether the Carnahans recreational use of the lake entitled them to a
prescriptive easement. The court disagreed with the lower courts and
found that entitlement to a recreational prescriptive easement
required clear and convincing evidence of an adverse use, something
the Carnahans failed to establish.
The court first distinguished a recreational use from the normal
ingress and egress over land. The court noted the presumption that
normal ingress and egress use of a road over another's property is
adverse to the owner. Recreational use is more permissive and if an
owner witnesses the claimant making use of the body of water and
does not intervene that does not mean the owner is acknowledging a
right by the claimant. The owner is merely permitting the claimant to
use the body of water. Thus, the court established that in order to
show entitlement to a recreational prescriptive easement, the claimant
must show use adverse to the owner. To prove "adverse" the claimant
needed to show use of the land as an owner without any regard to the
claims of others or permission from anyone for at least twenty years.
The court stated a claimant needed clear and convincing evidence to
prove adverse use.
Next, the court proceeded to review the evidence presented by the
Carnahans to establish adverse use. The court looked mainly to the
use while the Drewys owned the property because the majority of the
use occurred during that time. The court found that the Carnahans
engaged in leisurely use of the lake that did not affect the quality of
the lake. The recreational use of the lake was not inconsistent with the
Drewy's prior use. Therefore, the court held the Carnahans did not
establish entitlement to a recreational prescriptive easement, reversing
the findings of the lower court.
Karen McTavish

